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THE DARK SIDE 
OF TOWN
THE SOCIAL CAPITAL REVOLUTION
IN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY LAW
published in Virginia Law Review, volume 99
Associate Professor of Law
BA, Brown University
JD, Yale Law School
Stephanie M. Stern’s research focuses on applications of social and cognitive psychology to legal regimes of property ownership, land use, and environmental law. Her recent 
articles have appeared in the Michigan Law Review, Columbia Law Review, Cornell Law 
Review, Virginia Law Review, and Minnesota Law Review, and have been reprinted and 
discussed in several books.
Professor Stern joined the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty in 2009 and teaches in the areas 
of land use, environmental law, property, and commercial real estate transactions. Pro-
fessor Stern was previously an assistant professor at Loyola University Chicago School of 
Law and a Bigelow Teaching Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School. From 2001 
to 2003, she was an associate at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, focusing on property and environ-
mental litigation.
Following law school, Professor Stern clerked for Judge Kermit Lipez of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and served as a research fellow at the Yale Center 
for Law and Environmental Policy.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/sstern.
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In the past decade, there has been a remarkable ascendance of social capital theory in property policy and scholarship, a trend that has not been examined 
to date. Scholars and policymakers have advocated laws 
and property arrangements to promote social capital 
and relied on social capital to devolve property gov-
ernance from legal institutions to resident groups. 
My article, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital 
Revolution in Residential Property Law, examines the 
prevailing legal view of social capital’s salutary effects 
for local property law. In this paper, I present a more 
skeptical account of the dark side of residential social 
capital and its capacity to effectuate local factions, pro-
mote inegalitarianism, and close off property. 
Social capital is an influential theory of the value of 
participation in associations and organizations, social 
ties and networks, civic engagement and voting, trust, 
and norms of reciprocity in economic and political 
flourishing. In theory, social capital operates as a 
group-level positive externality that promotes eco-
nomic growth, better health and education outcomes, 
A summary of Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in Residential 
Property Law, 99 Virginia Law Review 811 (2013).
The Dark Side of Town
The Social Capital Revolution
in Residential Property Law
BY STEPHANIE M. STERN
[ 3 ] SPRING 2014
[ 4 ]  IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES
Stephanie Stern
“The deep imprints of racial 
segregation and land cartels on 
residential property illustrate 
social capital’s pervasive dark 
side and call into question the 
view of a social capital deficit 
that law should remedy.”
and, more tautologically, collective action 
and democratic participation. Local social 
capital is principally a theory of social co-
hesion, or bonding capital, and the capac-
ity of residential groups to produce public 
goods without the guiding hand of state or 
Keynesian intervention—a social science–
infused theory of residential gemeinschaft. 
While not blind to the potential ill effects 
and negative externalities of social capital, 
Putnam and other social capitalists none-
theless advance social capital as a positive 





ing how the under-
specified and en-
compassing nature 
of social capital 
makes it simulta-
neously attractive 
and dangerous to 
property policy and theory—part of the 
appeal of social capital is that it is ca-
pacious enough to justify a breadth of 
agendas. In the legal scholarship, property 
scholars have become enthusiastic social 
capitalists, writing about how home mort-
gage reform, land use law, homeowner-
ship, block-level governance and neigh-
borhood governance, school finance, pro-
cess restrictions on eminent domain, and 
laws governing common interest commu-
nities can promote, and capitalize upon, 
social capital. Property law can affirma-
tively build social capital by encouraging 
interpersonal interaction, mutual reliance, 
or residential tenure and stability. Some-
what circularly, in much legal scholarship 
social capital also fuels successful property 
institutions and enables devolution of 
governance and public and private goods 
provision to resident groups. The unifying 
strand of these narratives is that social 
capital, properly nourished, produces 
positive externalities in an acceptably, if 
not perfectly, egalitarian manner and de-
creases the need for legal institutions and 
the state. 
In the policy arena, social capital has 
had far-ranging influence in both local 
and federal government. In cities, as 
funds have dwindled following federal 
devolution to the states and shrinking 
state disbursements to localities, low cost, 
communitarian-style ventures that claim 










block grants, and 
other efforts to 
socialize city residents now ostensibly fur-
ther social capital goals in an era of shrink-
ing city funds for social services. Social 
capital theory underlies recent experiments 
in neighborhood self-governance, such as the 
Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization 
Program (NRP), which devolved local 
planning and fiscal funding to neighbor-
hoods. Social capital is also a growing 
feature of centralized land use planning, 
with some communities funding “Social 
Capital Assessments” to quantitatively 
measure their community’s social cap-
ital and describing social capital stock 
and goals in their comprehensive zoning 
plans. At the federal level, the government 
justifies homeownership subsidies in part 
on social capital goals, Hope VI public 
housing guidelines emphasize new urban- 
ist features claimed to enhance social 
interaction and build social capital, and 
HUD has adopted the social capital–
The Dark Side of Town
related theory of “defensible space.” 
My article advances a skeptical view of the benefits of local social capital in 
property law. My critique of social capital 
focuses on “bonding capital,” the more 
ubiquitous and theoretically central form 
of social capital. Such social capital is at 
the core of effectuating, and sometimes 
creating, local factions with interests 
contrary to the public interest and rights 
of other citizens that so concerned Mad-
ison. Networks, reciprocity, trust, tastes 
for participation, and social ties facilitate 
factional collusion to restrain residential 
property supply and to act on preexist-
ing preferences for illiberal exclusion. 
Moreover, social capital can also create 
or heighten such preferences as collective 
action escalates individual commitments 
and dense, reciprocal ties lock in bad 
norms and stifle dissent. 
In the first half of the article, I argue 
that rather than diminishing the role of 
law, abundant social capital may increase 
the need for legal safeguards and, in some 
cases, the desirability of formal institu-
tions. The deep imprints of racial segrega-
tion and land cartels on residential prop-
erty illustrate social capital’s pervasive 
dark side and call into question the view 
of a social capital deficit that law should 
remedy. For example, considerable social 
capital effectuated racial ouster in early to 
mid-twentieth century “sundown towns” 
across the United States that evicted 
black residents and visitors through 
threats, labor market exclusion, and vio-
lence. Today, social capital enables local 
citizens to lobby for exclusionary zoning 
laws that raise land prices by artificially 
constricting supply and to enforce these 
laws through citizen reports of violations 
and protests against higher-density devel-
opment. 
The latter part of the article explores 
how the enthusiasm for social capital 
has obscured tradeoffs in the allocation 
of property governance to residential 
groups. Governing through social capi-
tal can deliver cost-savings and benefits 
of local knowledge, but it may also di-
rectly empower factions, confine social 
exchange, and increase the demand for 
homogeneity. Devolving governance and 
public goods provision to residents ratchets 
up the importance of cooperation in the 
face of inflated, but widely held, percep-
tions that those who are similar cooperate 
best (in recent years, promoting social 
capital has verged perilously close to en-
gineering residential racial homogeneity). 
Social capital–mediated governance may 
also encourage illiberal internal distribu-
tions of property and governance roles 
when class- and characteristic-based so-
cial status serves as a “quick and dirty” 
allocation device to reduce the over-
whelming coordination costs of collective 
action. 
Implicit in my account is a more skep-
tical assessment of the claimed benefits 
of cohesive social capital to residential 
communities. After almost three decades 
of research, we know little about how to 
promote or extract positive social cap-
ital through property law or residential 
configurations—many attempts at social 
capital engineering have been fumbling 
and ill-fated. There is a sense, undoubt-
edly correct, that social ties, informal 
cooperation, and altruism within parent 
groups, congregations, extended families, 
and other groups can have social value. 
However, it is a leap from these voluntary, 
organic examples of social capital, often 
subject to thicker constraints or occurring 
in areas where government non-involve-
ment is pivotal to social or personal iden-
tity, to relying on social capital’s beneficial 
effects to devolve property governance or 
structure property law. 
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In conclusion, in developed market economies with established legal in-
stitutions, relying on social capital to 
regulate residential property or sustain 
community-governed property institu-
tions may be a second-best solution, at 
least in the absence of constraining laws 
and supportive institutions. The recent 
enthusiasm for social capital building and 
informal micro-governance may be a step 
backward to closed and private-minded 
societies—what Ferdinand Tönnies de-
scribed as gemeinschaft—that limit social 
exchange and sacrifice social progress for 
insularity. This is not to dismiss the work 
of Elinor Ostrom, Bob Ellickson, or other 
property and natural resource scholars 
writing in the social capital tradition. 
Rather, in The Dark Side of Town, I con-
tend that devolution from law and for-
mal institutions to self-governing groups 
requires a fuller accounting, one that 
includes social capital’s costs to residen-
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IS A FAIR TRIAL STILL POSSIBLE?




JD, Yale Law School
Nancy S. Marder joined the faculty of IIT Chicago-Kent in the fall of 1999. Prior to beginning her teaching career at the University of Southern California Law School, 
Professor Marder was a post-doctoral fellow at Yale Law School (1992–93) and a law 
clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court (1990–92). She also clerked 
for Judge William A. Norris on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1989–90) and Judge 
Leonard B. Sand in the Southern District of New York (1988–1989). In 1987–88, Profes-
sor Marder was a litigation associate at the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton & Garrison.
Professor Marder’s research and writing focus on the jury. She has written about 
many aspects of the jury, including peremptory challenges, jury instructions, jurors and 
technology, juror questions, jury nullification, post-verdict interviews of jurors, and jury 
deliberations. Her articles have appeared in such law reviews as Northwestern University 
Law Review, Iowa Law Review, Texas Law Review, Southern California Law Review, and 
Yale Law Journal, and she has organized four symposia in the Chicago-Kent Law Review: 
“The Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience,” “Secrecy in Litigation,” “The 50th 
Anniversary of 12 Angry Men,” and “Comparative Jury Systems.” Professor Marder is the 
author of the book The Jury Process (2005), and she has written several book chapters 
on the jury and on juries and judges in popular culture. Professor Marder regularly presents 
her scholarship at conferences in the United States and abroad.
Professor Marder reaches a wide audience with her work on the jury. She is the 
founder and director of the Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Center at Chicago-Kent, which 
informs scholars about new work on the jury and also undertakes special projects.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/nmarder.
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Slowly but surely the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial is being eroded as social media invades the jury room. Essential evidentiary rules control 
what jurors can learn about a case and what they can 
say about it during a trial. In just a decade, the rapid 
growth of easy online communication has threatened to 
dissolve the protective walls we have built around the 
jury. The key question is whether courts can now per-
suade jurors to resist the siren call of online communi-
cation when they serve as jurors. In this Article, I urge 
courts to take a “process view” of a juror’s education 
and to use every court-juror interaction as an opportu-
nity to teach jurors that they need to avoid using the In-
ternet and social media to communicate about the trial. 
When jurors turn to the Internet or social media for 
information about the trial they violate key precepts of 
a fair trial. The decision-maker is supposed to decide 
the case based only on the evidence presented in the 
courtroom. One reason is so that the case will be de-
cided based only on information that has met a certain 
threshold of reliability. Another reason is so that the 
A summary of Nancy S. Marder, Jurors and Social Media: Is a Fair Trial Still Possible?, forthcoming in volume 
67 of the Southern Methodist University Law Review (2014) (Criminal Justice Colloquium).
Jurors and Social Media
Is a Fair Trial Still Possible?
BY NANCY S. MARDER
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evidence is further tested through cross-
examination, which will reveal its weak-
nesses. Yet another reason is so that all of 
the decision-makers—jurors and judge 
alike—work from the same information. 
The juror who turns to the Internet or 
social media and either intentionally seeks 
or is inadvertently exposed to information 
pertaining to the trial will no longer rely 
just on the evidence presented in the 
courtroom. The juror who uses social 
media to express his or her views of the 
case will no longer appear to be impartial. 
Although some jurors in the past might 
have violated the judge’s instructions not 
to discuss the case with family or friends, 
the juror who does so today using social 
media reaches a far wider audience and 
receives far more media attention than a 
juror who spoke to family members in the 
past. The juror who turns to social media 
today to reveal his or her views calls into 
question the fairness of the jury trial.
Although newspaper headlines re-
count some of the more egregious exam-
ples of jurors using social media or the 
Internet to obtain information that is 
unreliable or inappropriate for them to 
consider, the scope of the problem is dif-
ficult to assess. The few empirical studies 
that have been done to date have serious 
limitations. One study, conducted by the 
Federal Judicial Center, asked participat-
ing judges for their perception of how 
often jurors used social media when they 
were in the courtroom or jury room. Not 
surprisingly, few judges observed jurors 
using social media in these settings. One 
problem is that it is difficult for judges to 
observe this behavior because they have 
many responsibilities in the courtroom. 
Another problem is that jurors could use 
social media outside of the courtroom 
and judges would not observe it. More-
over, asking judges for their perception is 
not the same as uncovering actual juror 
use of social media. Another study in-
volved two federal district court judges 
who asked jurors to complete a survey 
after they had served as jurors in their 
courtrooms. The survey did not reveal 
any instances of jurors’ use of the Inter-
net or social media. In fact, only 6 out of 
the 140 jurors who completed the survey 
admitted even a temptation to commu-
nicate about the trial using social media, 
and all six said that they had resisted the 
temptation. The authors concluded that 
this shows that jurors follow the judge’s 
instructions. However, the problem with 
this small study is that it asked jurors 
while they were still in the courtroom 
to admit to the judge who had presided 
over the trial that they had disobeyed the 
judge’s instructions. Jurors are unlikely to 
be forthcoming in those circumstances, 
even though they were permitted to com-
plete the survey anonymously.
Judges feel the need to take action, but in the face of limited empirical evi-
dence, they have not been sure what to 
do. The most common response is to re-
vise the cautionary instruction in an effort 
to make it clear to jurors that they need to 
refrain from using the Internet and social 
media during the trial. A few courts have 
gone so far as to ban jurors from having 
electronic devices in the courtroom and 
deliberation room, but this response does 
not address the problem that jurors will 
have access to these devices when they go 
home at night. 
Having jurors refrain from using the 
“The juror who uses social 
media to express his or her 
views of the case will no
longer appear to be impartial.”
Jurors and Social Media
Internet and social media while they 
serve as jurors is likely to grow harder in 
the years ahead and will require taking 
what I call a “process view” of a juror’s 
education. A process view recognizes 
that at every stage that the court interacts 
with jurors there is an opportunity to ed-
ucate them. From start to finish—from 
jury summons to jury verdict—there are 
opportunities for 
the court to edu-
cate jurors about 
the need to avoid 
online communi-
cation about the 
trial. 
The educa-
tion of a juror 
begins with the jury summons and ends 
when the jury announces its verdict and 
the judge polls the jury and dismisses it. 
The jury summons can include a ques-
tion that asks prospective jurors if they 
can adhere to the judge’s instruction and 
avoid engaging in online communication 
about the trial. While prospective jurors 
are in the Jury Assembly Room, waiting 
to be assigned to a courtroom, they usu-
ally watch a jury orientation video that 
teaches them about the role of the jury. 
This video can also include a segment on 
the need to avoid online communication 
about the trial. Some states, such as Mas-
sachusetts, already include such a seg-
ment in their video. The voir dire, when 
prospective jurors are questioned to see if 
they can serve on a particular jury, pro-
vides another opportunity for the judge 
and lawyers to question prospective jurors 
and to elicit a public commitment from 
them that they can refrain from commu-
nicating online about the trial. In some 
states, such as Illinois, jurors have the 
opportunity to submit written questions 
to witnesses. Judges in such states can 
explain to jurors that they will be able to 
submit their questions to witnesses; thus, 
they do not need to engage in online self-
help to find answers. 
The judge can also use the preliminary 
cautionary instructions, final instructions, 
and admonitions before and after every 
recess as opportunities to reinforce the 
point that jurors must refrain from con-
ducting their own research on the Inter-
net and can only 
share their views 
with their fellow 
jurors during de-
liberations. In fact, 
one judge in the 
Northern District 
of Illinois asks 
jurors when they 
return from a recess whether they have 
refrained from online communication 
during the break. He asks jurors to raise 
their hands to show that they have abided 
by the court’s instruction. In the public 
setting of the courtroom, jurors must take 
the affirmative step of raising their hands 
and publicly declaring that they have ad-
hered to the prohibition. Of course, it is 
important that the instruction or admo-
nition is specific and includes an expla-
nation so that jurors understand exactly 
what they can and cannot do and why. At 
each of these stages in the trial process, 
the judge should make use of the oppor-
tunity to educate jurors about their need 
to refrain from online communication 
about the trial.
A process view of a juror’s education will be effective for most, but not all, 
jurors. A comprehensive education should 
transform “uninformed jurors” into in-
formed jurors. Uninformed jurors want 
to do the right thing but do not know 
that online communication is prohibited. 
Once they understand that they cannot 
consult the Internet or social media, 
“A ‘process view’ of jurors’ 
education recognizes that at 
every stage that the court 
interacts with jurors there is an 
opportunity to educate them.”
[ 11 ] SPRING 2014
[ 12 ]  IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES
Nancy Marder
they will abide by the judge’s instruction. 
Admittedly, this proposal will not reach 
“recalcitrant jurors,” who will remain un-
moved by any education. For recalcitrant 
jurors, who have no intention of following 
the prohibition, the best hope is for law-
yers and judges to find new ways to iden-
tify and remove them during voir dire. If 
they do manage to avoid detection during 
voir dire, then it is up to other jurors to 
spot them when they violate the prohibi-
tion and report them to the judge.
Judges are likely to embrace this pro-
posal because it is flexible and they can 
tailor it as they see fit. They might question 
whether so much repetition is necessary, 
but they can take shortcuts when appropri-
ate. Most important, a process view of a 
juror’s education is likely to be effective, 
and judges need an effective approach 
because it is their responsibility to ensure 
that the parties receive a fair trial. This 
Article explores what it means to take a 
process view of a juror’s education in or-
der to protect the parties’ constitutional 
right to a fair trial.  ■
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
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Century, 81 Notre Dame Law Review 449 (2006).
Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the 
Jury, 74 Fordham Law Review 1683 (2006) (sympo-
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The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Northwestern 
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Ronald W. Staudt practiced with the firm of Hubacheck, Kelly, Rauch & Kirby for two years, was staff attorney and assistant director of the Pima County, Arizona, 
Legal Aid Society, and was a clinical fellow and lecturer at the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, 
University of Chicago Law School, before joining the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty in 1978. 
From 1994 through 1998, on leave from Chicago-Kent, he served as vice president for 
technology development and associated positions at LexisNexis Inc. in Dayton, Ohio.
Professor Staudt teaches Copyright Law, Intellectual Property Strategies, Internet 
Law, Public Interest Law & Policy, Justice and Technology Practicum, and Access to 
Justice and Technology. He is director of the Center for Access to Justice & Technology 
(CAJT)—a law school center using Internet resources to improve access to justice with 
special emphasis on building Web tools to support legal services advocates, pro bono 
volunteers, and pro se litigants.
Professor Staudt has written numerous articles and books on technology and law. His 
most recent book is a report co-authored with Charles L. Owen, Distinguished Professor 
of Design at IIT’s Institute of Design, and Edward B. Pedwell, titled Access to Justice: 
Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants.
Professor Staudt is a fellow, board member, and president of the College of Law Prac-
tice Management. He serves on many boards and committees that promote technology 
solutions to access to justice problems.
For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/rstaudt.
Andrew P. Medeiros is an Associate Legal Solutions Architect with the Legal Tech-nology Innovations Office (LTIO) at Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
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The Great Recession of 2008 caused widespread law firm layoffs, falling salaries, and hiring freezes and may leave a generation of young attorneys 
searching for work. The economic crisis included signif-
icant reductions in banking, finance, corporate restruc-
turing and real estate transactions and reduced the need 
for high‐priced legal services. As large law firm reve-
nues fell, firms protected profits by reducing labor costs.
Large clients demanded discounts and fixed fee 
arrangements and sought efficiencies to reduce their 
legal spending. As the customers of lawyers demanded 
“more for less,” new technologies were introduced and 
old technologies revived to increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of law practice. In our view, these new 
technologies are not the cause of disruption in legal 
markets, but rather the tools that creative lawyers and 
legal consultants are using to adapt to the demands of 
customers of lawyers at all market levels. These new 
efficiencies and new technologies are here to stay. Even 
if the gross domestic legal product returns to pre‐2008 
levels, the work will be forever changed.
Excerpted from Ronald W. Staudt and Andrew P. Medeiros, Access to Justice and Technology Clinics: A 4% 
Solution, 88 Chicago-Kent Law Review 695 (2013) (symposium).
BY RONALD W. STAUDT AND ANDREW P. MEDEIROS
Access to Justice and Technology Clinics
A 4% Solution
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The ironic twist is that despite an 
oversupply of lawyers, we are failing to 
meet the legal needs of ordinary people, 
especially people with low or modest 
incomes. Legal Services Corporation 
funded legal aid offices turn away a mil-
lion eligible prospective clients every year 
because they lack the capacity and the 
lawyers to serve these legal needs. In ad-
dition, millions of modest income people 
who are not eligible for legal aid cannot 
afford the fees charged by lawyers. The 
economic downturn starting in 2008 ex-
acerbated this legal services gap, driving 
more modest‐income people into poverty 
and more employed people into unem-
ployment and foreclosure. Fully 21% of 
the U.S. population is now at or below the 
poverty line set by federal standards for 
free legal aid to the poor. More than 80% 
of the legal needs of low income people 
are not met by overstretched legal aid re-
sources. 
The oversupply of legal talent trig-
gered attacks on law schools from all 
angles. Critics charged that law schools 
accept too many students, saddle them 
with massive amounts of debt, and do not 
adequately prepare them for a legal job. 
The reduction in job opportunities for law 
school graduates and negative publicity 
already have cut deeply into the number 
of law school applicants. If law schools 
maintain admissions standards, fewer 
applicants should cause a parallel reduc-
tion in the number of law students in the 
professional pipeline; the supply of new 
lawyers should “right size” to match legal 
industry needs. 
These new lawyers will need new 
skills. The technology changes triggered 
by the economic shock have changed the 
tools lawyers use to deliver legal services. 
New lawyers entering the profession must 
be ready to practice in today’s more effi-
cient and more technology-driven work-
A2J Author® welcome screen.
Access to Justice and Technology Clinics
place. For the most part, law schools are 
not currently equipped to teach these new 
skills and technologies.
This article responds to the criticisms of the quality of legal education, crit-
icisms that law schools fail to prepare 
graduates to succeed in the profession. 
We propose a modest improvement to 
the law school curriculum that may make 
graduates more capable to serve their cli-
ents. Professor William Henderson of the 
University of Indiana Law School urges 
a 12% solution, arguing that law schools 
should begin to introduce competency- 
based courses at a rate of one course per 
year. We offer here a proposal for one of 
the three new courses, a 4% solution.
We propose that law schools add a 
new type of clinical course that teaches 
law students how to use and deploy tech-
nology to assist law practice. The changes 
we propose will affect about four percent 
of the average law 
school curriculum. 
If widely adopted, 
the changes we 
propose will help 
law students to 
learn core com-
petencies needed 
in an increasingly 
technological pro-
fession, while they 
build tools and 
write content to 
help low‐income, 
self‐represented 
litigants overcome serious barriers in the 
pursuit of justice.
Specifically, we propose that law 
schools offer a new clinical experience— 
the Access to Justice Technology Clinic, 
or A2J Clinic for short. The Center for 
Computer‐Assisted Legal Instruction 
(CALI®), in partnership with IIT Chicago‐
Kent College of Law, has launched its 
Access to Justice Clinical Course Project 
to develop and refine A2J Clinics. In these 
courses, law students build web tools and 
other interactive content to help low‐in-
come people achieve their justice goals. 
Courses of this type have been taught 
by several law schools during the past 
decade. This CALI initiative builds on 
those efforts, organizes faculty across the 
country into a team of collaborators, and 
establishes a structured process to share 
new insights, tools, and curricula with all 
law schools.
Law school clinics are not the only 
feasible home for our proposed courses. 
Legal writing faculty and traditional 
podium teachers could also teach these 
courses if they were so inclined. But clin-
ical educators are predisposed to focus 
on skills that go beyond legal analysis. 
Clinical educators are also deeply com-
mitted to access to justice and they, with 
their students, al-
ready provide a huge 
contribution to help 
meet the legal needs 
of low income peo-
ple. Like the clinical 
movement triggered 
by CLEPR in the 
1960’s and 1970’s, 
we think that this 
new type of course 
will fit comfortably 
into the clinical 
curriculum of many 
law schools and that 
such additions will improve legal educa-
tion and simultaneously reduce barriers 
to justice for low income people.
There is no single, magical software or invention that is disrupting settled 
legal markets and labor practices. Instead, 
lawyers in corporate practices and lawyers 
“We propose that law schools 
add a new type of clinical 
course that teaches law 
students how to use and 
deploy technology to assist 
law practice. The changes we 
propose will affect about four 
percent of the average law 
school curriculum.”
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serving personal legal needs have been 
forced to innovate by clients who refused 
to pay for outdated and inefficient labor 
practices. While legal costs are being 
wrung out of the high priced legal mar-
ket and many young attorneys struggle 
to find legal work, we live in an age when 
access to affordable legal services is still 
impossible for many Americans. 
Law schools have a unique opportu-
nity to address the education deficiencies 
and the access to justice problem at once. 
The law school curriculum must adapt 
to produce new lawyers who are fluent 
with the technical tools that are becoming 
standard in law offices around the country. 
The Access to Justice Clinical Course 
Project will arm students with document 
assembly and automation tools, supply 
legal aid organizations with interactive 
content to help reduce barriers to justice, 
and trigger a reexamination of the core 
lawyering competencies that law schools 
need to teach. Now is the time for a re-
newed clinical effort focused on refin-
ing our methods of teaching traditional 
competencies, developing new models 
for teaching transactional approaches to 
personal legal services, and teaching the 
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The election in 2010 of conservative Republi-can legislative majorities and governors in many states led to a major retrenchment in public em-
ployee collective bargaining rights in the United States. 
The legislation enacted in these states following the 
elections aimed to strengthen unilateral employer con-
trol and weaken employee voice. This rebalancing of 
power occurred in the context of state public employee 
labor relations acts that are largely modeled on the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the federal stat-
ute that governs most private sector employers, employ-
ees and unions. The NLRA classifies subjects of bar-
gaining as mandatory, permissive and prohibited. Only 
subjects classified as mandatory need be bargained. All 
others are left to the unilateral control of the party, typi-
cally the employer, with the decision-making power.
In the U.S. public sector, courts and labor relations 
agencies have defined mandatory subjects of bargaining 
much more narrowly than in the private sector. This is 
largely due to concerns that many terms and conditions 
of employment also raise issues of public policy which, 
Excerpted from Martin H. Malin, Collective Representation and Employee Voice in the U.S. Public Sector 
Workplace: Looking North for Solutions?, 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 903 (2013).
Collective Representation
And Employee Voice in the U.S. Public Sector
Workplace: Looking North for Solutions?
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the authorities reason, should be resolved 
in the public political process rather than 
at a bargaining table to which only the 
union and em-
ployer have access. 
Issues such as 




drug testing, and 
use of civilian po-
lice review boards 
that directly affect employee working 
conditions have, nevertheless, been held 
to not be mandatory subjects because 
they raise questions of public policy more 
appropriately left to the political pro-
cess. The result of such a narrow scope 
of bargaining is to channel unions away 
from having a voice on matters that can 
improve the quality of public services 
and toward bread and butter issues of 
wages and benefits and protecting their 
members from the effects of decisions 
unilaterally imposed by management. 
Unions’ efforts to protect their members 
from management’s unilateral action may 
be seen as union obstruction to reform. 
Unions’ success in the role to which they 
have been relegated has led to backlash, 
further narrowing the scope of bargaining 
and otherwise reducing worker voice.
The U.S. Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that public employees’ First 
Amendment right to freedom of associa-
tion includes a right to join a union but, 
reasoning that their governmental em-
ployer is not constitutionally required to 
listen to their union, has rejected the idea 
that freedom of association includes a 
right to collective bargaining. In contrast, 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has 
held that the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms’ (Charter) protection of the 
right to freedom of association include a 
right to collective bargaining.
Although most Canadian labor law 
statutes are modeled on the NLRA, in 
Fraser v Ontario 
(SCC 2011), the 
SCC held that the 
Charter does not 
guarantee a right 
to an NLRA-model 
of collective bar-
gaining. This Ar-
ticle suggests that 
the evolving law 
under the Canadian Charter can inspire 
reform in U.S. public sector labor law.
The NLRA mandates that when a ma-
jority of a specifically defined group of an 
employer’s employees select a union as 
their representative, the union becomes the 
exclusive representative of all employees in 
that defined group. The employer must ne-
gotiate in good faith with the union over 
mandatory subjects of bargaining and may 
not make unilateral changes unless and 
until it has negotiated to impasse. Both 
sides may resort to economic weapons—
strike or other job action for unions, lock-
out, replacement of strikers or unilateral 
change after impasse for employers—to 
pressure the other side in bargaining. 
Many public sector statutes prohibit 
strikes and lockouts and substitute arbi-
tration of disputed issues or non-binding 
fact-finding to resolve impasses.
In Fraser, the SCC upheld the Ontario 
Agricultural Employees Protection Act 
(AEPA). The AEPA granted agricultural 
employees rights to form, join and partic-
ipate in employee associations, to assem-
ble, and to make representations, orally or 
in writing, to their employers concerning 
terms and conditions of employment. It 
imposed a duty on employers to listen to 
the representations and, when represen-
tations are made in writing, to read them 
and to provide a written acknowledgment 
“The difference in approaches 
north and south of the border 
to collective bargaining and 
freedom of association may be 
traced to different treatment
of property rights.”
Collective Representation and Employee Voice
that it has read them. The SCC interpret-
ed the AEPA as imposing on employers a 
duty to consider employee representations 
in good faith. So interpreted, the SCC 
held that the AEPA was consistent with the 
Charter’s right of freedom of association.
The difference in approaches north and south of the border to collective 
bargaining and freedom of association 
may be traced to different treatment of 
property rights. Whereas the Constitu-
tion expressly protects property rights, 
the Charter omits mention of them and 
this omission was deliberate. It reflected 
concern that protection of property rights 
would invalidate economic regulation and 
disturb the recognition that had evolved 
in Canada of the primacy of democratic 
will over property rights with respect to 
such regulation.
In the U.S. private sector, property 
rights drive labor law. The limitation 
that the duty to bargain extends only to 
mandatory subjects recognizes that some 
matters, although directly affecting job se-
curity or other conditions of employment, 
lie at the heart of entrepreneurial control. 
Compelling bargaining on these matters 
would intrude on employer unilateralism, 
that is, on employer control over what it 
may do with its property.
The different approaches to property 
rights may justify dismissing the evolving 
jurisprudence under the Charter when 
considering private sector labor law in the 
U.S., but the same may not be said with 
respect to the U.S. public sector. Public 
employers do not have private property 
rights. Their premises are public property.
Moreover, the NLRA is premised on, 
among other things, a congressional find-
ing of a need to equalize bargaining pow-
er between employers and unions, that is, 
a need to place limits on otherwise unlim-
ited employer property rights. In contrast, 
most public sector labor relations acts are 
premised on legislative findings that col-
lective bargaining is in the public interest. 
The differences between the public and 
private sectors in the U.S. suggest that the 
evolving jurisprudence under the Charter 
should not be dismissed out of hand in 
considering public sector labor law.
The decision in Fraser is ambiguous. 
It is not clear what the SCC means when 
it speaks of agricultural employers’ duty 
to consider employee associations’ repre-
sentations in good faith. As I read Fraser, 
there cannot be good faith consideration 
of employee representations without 
meaningful discussion with the employ-
ees’ association. Furthermore, where 
there is an established employee repre-
sentative, a statutory regime that enables 
an employer to act unilaterally without 
providing the representative notice and 
an opportunity for the making of repre-
sentations and the conduct of meaningful 
discussion effectively renders worker as-
sociational activity meaningless.
The expansion in the U.S. of increas-
ing employer power channels unions into 
doing whatever they can to protect their 
members from the consequences of de-
cisions imposed unilaterally by their em-
ployers. Over the long term, it is not sus-
tainable as it channels worker voice away 
from contributing to the effective deliv-
ery of public services. Instead, we must 
broaden the range of subjects on which 
workers have a voice, although not neces-
sarily under a traditional NLRA model.
“We must broaden the range
of subjects on which workers 
have a voice, although not 
necessarily under a traditional 
NLRA model.”
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The evolving Canadian jurisprudence mandates avoiding measures that 
render worker associational activity 
meaningless and employing measures 
that provide for meaningful discussion 
of worker representations. The presenta-
tion of decisions that significantly impact 
workers’ workplace lives as fait accompli 
renders workers’ associational activities 
meaningless. Critical to any reform that 
broadens the subjects on which workers 
have a voice is a requirement of advance 
notice and an opportunity for pre-deci-
sional involvement.
A failure to supply relevant infor-
mation bears a high risk of rendering 
worker associational activity meaningless. 
Without adequate information, workers 
and their unions are in no position to 
make representations to their employers 
and it is difficult to see how a good faith 
dialogue can occur in an information 
vacuum. The exchange of information 
facilitates good faith dialogue because it 
engenders trust and allows the explora-
tion of mutually beneficial solutions. Any 
right to engage in meaningful dialogue 
must include a duty to exchange relevant 
information.
The right to represent the workers 
must remain with their exclusive bargain-
ing representative. By-passing the union 
to negotiate directly with individual em-
ployees must, as it is under traditional 
labor law with respect to mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining, be a per se indicator 
of bad faith.
When employees through their unions 
make representations to employers, em-
ployers must offer their reasons for de-
clining the unions’ proposals. Providing 
such reasons facilitates further engage-
ment by inviting the union to refine its 
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proposals and can lead to cooperative dis-
cussions about mutual and competing in-
terests. “We won’t do it because you can’t 
make us,” is not an acceptable response.
The above analysis does not provide 
a magic formula for crafting reforms that 
expand the scope of workers’ rights to 
a voice in workplace decision-making 
through alternatives to NLRA-style col-
lective bargaining, but it does provide 
a framework for evaluation of specific 
reforms. Inspired by the evolving juris-
prudence under the Canadian Charter, 
we can expand public employee collec-
tive voice in ways that are beneficial to 
employees, employers and the public at-
large.  ■
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